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There is a general trend in capitalist societies 
with regard to the nature of employment 
contracts and relations. The old promise of 
formal or continuous employment following 
a probationary period is no longer the norm. 
It is increasingly harder to get into work, 
with competitive selection tournaments and 
rotating internships; and when employed, the 
length and security of contracts are changing, 
with zero hour contracts and agency work 
growing, and direct employment by the 
firm diminishing for new workers. These 
trends have prompted some to argue that a 
new class of precariously employed workers 
(the precariat) is emerging to challenge 
the ‘privileges’ of those who are securely 
employed. This internal conflict within the 
working class has been projected as more 
important than conflicts between labour and 
capital. This essay looks at these debates in 
China, where some writers are beginning 
to apply these ideas to argue that there is 
a structural bi-furcation in the Chinese 
working class.
The Precariat Thesis and 
China
In his conceptualisation of the rise of 
precarious work, Guy Standing suggests 
that internal divisions within the working 
class, between those in regular/standard 
employment, judged as being a privileged 
‘salariat’, and those excluded from standard 
employment contracts, considered as a 
disadvantaged ‘precariat’, forms the main 
‘class divide’ in contemporary capitalism. 
However, as Jane Hardy has pointed out, 
the problem with arguing that workers 
on regular jobs ‘are a privileged group’ is 
that it ‘completely denies the realities of 
life in the public sector, which has faced 
commodification, marketization and taken 
the brunt of austerity.’ Looking back at the 
history of capitalism, well-defined and 
comprehensive employment security was only 
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The increasing precariousness of labour forces 
globally has prompted some to argue that a 
new ‘precariat’ is emerging to challenge the 
privileges of the securely employed ‘salariat’. 
This divergence within the working class has 
been depicted as more significant than the 
traditional conflict between labour and capital. 
This essay examines these discussions in China, 
where precarity is increasingly being employed 
as a theoretical tool to explain the fragmentation 
of labour in the country. 
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enjoyed by labour for a relatively short period 
of time (from the 1950s to the 1970s) and only 
in advanced economies. In fact, the category 
of precariat is extremely diverse, including 
students, temporary and contract workers, 
elderly workers, migrant and immigrant 
workforces, as well as workers with very 
different skill and educational levels. Thus, 
members of the precariat are defined by 
their lack of secure contracts. The thesis 
stresses divisions between the two groups, or 
empirical examples of collaborations between 
workers on different contracts. Standing 
provides no empirical evidence that people in 
insecure employment identified themselves 
as part of a separate class. This hints at the 
fact that ‘precariat’ is an academic term 
with little traction in people’s lives and self-
identification in class terms.
The employment situation in China follows 
some of these generic trends, but also has 
distinctive characteristics that allow close 
examination of the claim that the precariat 
is a separate new class. In 2014, China had 
772.5 million employed persons, 274 million 
of whom were rural ‘migrant workers’ 
(nongmingong). These migrants are excluded 
from many basic social benefits because of the 
country’s restrictive household registration 
system (hukou), which is used by employers 
to segment workers by different contracts, 
even though they generally perform similar 
types of work. 
In the case of China, we find that there 
is a contradictory movement with regard 
to regular and insecure work. On the one 
hand, legislation has increased security for 
regular workers in mass production and 
mass service industries, where more regular 
forms of employment have been recognised 
and protected by law. On the other, the very 
same legislation has also created incentives 
for employers to use agency or dispatched 
workers and bring in non-regular workers. 
Additionally, many self-employed rural 
migrants are involved in the informal sector, 
or are employed in the formal sector but 
appear to have informal working conditions. 
Increasingly, urbanised migrant workers 
continue to be denied equal citizenship 
and welfare rights, and hold rural hukou 
in perpetuity. The hukou system ‘makes’ 
workers, but not stable urban working class 
communities. Proletarianisation is separated 
from urbanisation, and working class 
community development, which is a typical 
process in most modernisation projects, is 
highly fractured in China. 
Student Interns, Agency 
Workers, and Formal 
Workers
In a recent attempt to apply the precariat 
concept to China, Chunsen Yu offers a more 
detailed empirical assessment of the value of 
the idea. While we are critical of some of his 
argument, what his work shows is that the 
boundary between regular and non-regular 
work is often crossed. Against a static view of 
classes of employee, the China case is dynamic 
and the inflexible concept of the precariat 
singularly unhelpful. In particular, Yu focuses 
on the objective conditions of insecurity of 
rural migrants and uses three indicators of 
precariat status—non-signing of long-term 
labour contracts, irregular payments of 
wages, and non-provision of social security. 
These conditions are looked at through three 
elements of ‘precariat migrant worker class’—
student interns, agency workers, and regular 
workers, which are explored in an empirical 
study of these workers in seven multinational 
companies operating in two regions of China: 
the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing, and 
the Longhua and Futian districts in Shenzhen. 
In Chongqing the local government 
promoted ‘school–enterprise cooperation’ but 
according to Yu’s findings—which contradict 
official data that says formal workers are the 
majority of employees—60 percent of the 
assembly line workers he interviewed were 
student interns. Reinforcing the findings 
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of others, student interns in his sample 
performed unskilled regular work that bore no 
relation to their studies. They also worked for 
less pay, facing the double burden of factory 
work and school supervision. Yu documents 
that student interns in Chongqing had no 
choice but to comply with their schools’ 
internship arrangements with hi-tech 
factories and other types of manufacturing 
factories.’
Categorising students as part of the precariat 
because of their insecure employment means 
ignoring the major element of their status, i.e. 
the fact that they are undergoing vocational 
training and hence work only for the short-
term. Although they often do not receive 
specialist training in their chosen field, 
this does not change the fact that they are 
structurally temporary workers who plan 
to pursue their career elsewhere. This is a 
constrained, transitional labour force. Yu 
bemoans their lack of commitment to work 
and the struggle by this section of the so-
called precariat, but this is largely due to the 
abuse of the internship system by colleges 
and employers, and it is hardly surprising to 
find members of this group wishing to leave 
employment that does not match their area of 
study or their career aspirations. 
Due to this mismatch, student interns show 
a high level of dissatisfaction with factories, 
and are disengaged with both labour processes 
and collective action. Yu’s research reveals 
that the majority of his student interns were 
confused about their identities, as they saw 
themselves as students, not full-time workers. 
At the same time, though, they were engaged 
in hi-tech factories and treated as full-time 
workers doing assembly line work.
Agency workers face a different set of 
problems. Working through an agency sets 
up a triangular relationship between workers 
and employers. This can add complexity to 
these relations, as well as fraud, as bogus 
employment agencies can easily dupe young 
migrants, taking fees without providing 
work. Problems can also arise in the event 
of a labour controversy, as employers and 
agencies dispute responsibility for health 
and safety failings. In Yu’s research, some 
companies used a limited number of agencies, 
generally just the larger ones, while others 
had a more diverse approach, hiring workers 
through several commercial labour agencies. 
Some companies maintained that they offered 
a temporary-to-permanent pattern of work, 
with workers having the opportunity to 
become formal workers after a probationary 
period, but when Yu spoke to agency workers, 
they disputed this easy transition. Instead, for 
them an ‘agency labour regime’ meant little 
control over work allocation and schedules, 
as well as regular reassignments to different 
types of jobs and easy dismissal. 
Still, this and other accounts that stress 
the negative effects of agencies in forming 
barriers to secure work ignore the fact that 
workers possess labour mobility power and 
they can change agencies if things don’t 
turn out well. Given the large number of 
agencies in China, there is fierce competition 
between them for labour, a situation that 
creates bargaining power for workers. While 
agencies may try to avoid recruiting workers 
who change jobs frequently, the high levels of 
turnover mean this rule is difficult to apply. 
Finally, regarding formal workers, while 
they have regular employment, they also 
face specific problems. For instance, they 
are forced to change their jobs frequently, 
due to factors that include variations in 
production seasons; the practice of loaning 
employees (zhiyuan) to other departments or 
factories; the tradition of changing workers’ 
job specifications and labour relationships 
(fenliu); as well as an abusive labour regime 
that involves the use of ‘constructive 
dismissal’, active pressure to take on 
unwanted tasks, and limited job security. 
Posted workers often lose out financially. 
For example, enrolment at Foxconn was 
effectively compulsory, with formal workers 
being punished with reduced overtime if they 
did not participate. According to Yu, factories 
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routinely violate labour contracts to change 
formal workers’ work, content, and locations, 
effectively ‘selling’ labourers from the 
original factories to other factories or firms.
Problems with the 
Precariat in China
The idea central to the precariat thesis, 
that there is a class divide in terms of the 
employment conditions of the salariat and 
precariat, falls at the first hurdle. All workers 
are insecure in China, and precariousness is 
not evidence of a separate class, but part of 
the general condition of waged labour in the 
country. Take the issue of high labour turnover, 
seen as indicative of precarity. In fact, labour 
turnover is high for all groups and in part 
expresses the mobility power of labour—
and, as such, it has been a central mechanism 
for improving wages and conditions. Jobs 
were more precarious in the 1980s and 
the 1990s than in the new millennium 
when precariousness acquired structural 
significance. More recent protection, if not 
standardisation of employment relations, 
due to state labour policy and legislation, 
has coincided with more labour resistance 
and collective actions. More importantly, 
precarity has been the fate of two generations 
of migrant workers, but in terms of labour 
disputes and collective actions, we witness 
much more in the new or second generation, 
as indicated by numerous empirical studies. 
For instance, Pringle notes that in the 2010 
dispute at a Honda transmissions factory in 
Foshan, agency workers were a critical part 
of the action. 
The official categorisation of peasant 
workers—wage labourers with rural 
household registration—keeps their social 
status and class identities ambiguous. Taking 
a specific path of proletarianisation, the new 
generation of migrant workers has gradually 
become aware of their class position and 
participated in a series of collective actions. 
The migrant workers are now experiencing 
a deeper sense of anger and dissatisfaction 
than that of the first generation, accompanied 
by the realisation that the return to their 
hometowns is more problematic.
To conclude, precariousness as a process 
is a useful concept, ‘precariat’ is not. At 
different times, precariousness is a more or 
less important attribute of being a worker. 
The idea that security is fixed and settled 
is unhelpful as is the idea of a new class 
called the ‘precariat’. The processes of 
creating non-standard forms of employment 
are recognisable across work with different 
forms of status, from unskilled to more 
white collar and professional occupations. 
More importantly, we need to look at 
interactions between workers on different 
contracts in production relations, and not 
invent employment differences that confuse 
employment status and social class. Class is 
about ownership relations, and structural 
class relations between labour and capital.
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